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Regret and disuppoin[men( are emolions thut can be experienced in response to an unJrrvorable outcome oja decision.
Previous research sugges(s thal both emotions are rela(ed m the process ojcounterjactua! thinking. The present re-
search extenris this idea by combining it with ideasjrom regret and disappointment theory. The results show tha! regret
is related to behaviorfvcused counterjactual thought in which the decisian-maker's own actions are changed, whereas
disappointment is related to situa(ionfocused counterjactual (hvught in which aspects ojthe situation are changed. (n
.Study ! participanrs(N - IJO) were asked to recallan autabiographicalepisode ojeither a regre(ful or a disappoin(-
ing event. When asked m undo this event, regretparticipantspredominandy changed thelr own actions, whereas dlsap-
pointment par(icipantspredominantly changedarpects ojthe si(uativn. In Study 2 all participants (N - SO) read a sce-
nurio in which a person experiences a negative event. Participantswho were instructed m undo (he event by changing
(he person's ac(ions repvrted more regre( than disappoinJment, while participants who were instruc(ed to undo the
event bv changing aspects ojthe situation reported more disappointment than regrel. Study 3(N - 140) replicated the
findings,jrom Study 1 with a dijferent scenario, und a design in which regret and disappointmen( were measured be-
tween rather than within subjects. In the discussion we address the relations between counterjactval lhinking, attribu-
tions unduJjecrive reactions to decision outcomes, and the implications jor decision research.
Decision outcomes often evoke emotional reactions. For example, one can be disappointed when
finding out that the outcome ofa chosen option is worse than what was initially expected, or one can feel
regret upon discovering that one would have obtained a better outcome had one chosen another option. Of
course, [hese emotional reactions influence our satisfaction with the obtained decision outcome, or, in other
words, its utility. Thus, when buying a new VCR, the satisfaction or utility derived from that particular VCR
depends not only on the attributes ofVCR itself, but also on how it compares to the prior set expectations
and the attributes of unchosen alternatives. This psychological process ofcomparing the obtained outcome
with other possible outcomes has become known as counterfac[ual thinking.
In the present paper we focus on how these counterfactual thoughts about "what might have been"
influence specific emotional reactions to decision outcomes. We argue that the content ofthe counterfactual
thoughts (i.e., the specific alternative outcome to which the obtained outcome is compared) has an impact
on which emotion is experienced. Studying how these psychological processes cause these specific emo-
tional reactions is not only interesting for its own sake. As shown by recent empirical research, people an-
ticipate emotions, and take them into account when making decisions (e.g., Beattie, Baron, Hershey, Bc
Spranca, 1994; Larrick 8c Boles, 1995; Ritov, 1996; Zeelenberg 8c Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van
der Pligt 8c de Vries, 1996). Knowledge about the role of counterfactual thought in the experience of emo-
tions can therefore help us understand the role ofemotions in decision-making.
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Countertactual Thinking
Counterfactual thinking involves mentally mutating one or more aspects of a past event. lt includes
thoughts in which current reality is changed into what might, could, would, or should have been. By men-
tally simulating what happened, and comparing it to what might otherwise have happened, an individual can
come to an understanding of how reality came about. An individual can rerun what has happened, while
changing aspects of his or her own actions, and see if, and how, this would have made a difference. ln these
simulations one can also change aspects of the situation and examine whether these differences could have
prevented something from happening, or would have promoted the occurrence of other events. In this way
counterfactual thinking may influence an individual's attributions for the current reality (Kahneman, 1992;
Kahneman 8r Miller, 1986; Wells á Gavanski, 1989).
In addition to this influence on attributions, counterfactual thinking has also been shown to inFluence
individuals' emotional reactions to outcomes and events (e.g., Boles 8c Messick, 1995; Kahneman, 8c Tver-
sky, 1982; Medvec, Madey, 8c Gilovich, 1995). For example, if one wins a small prize in a lottery, satisfac-
tion with this prize is not always easily predicted. How satisfied one feels depends very much on which al-
ternative to reality (or default) comes to mind. Where winning a larger prize is the alternative to reality, one
would be less satiafied than if winning no prize at all is Gonstrued as the alternative. Thus, by constructing
alternatives with which reality is contrasted, counterfactual thinking can influence the intensity of an emo-
tional reaction; this has been referred to as emotiona! amplification (Kahneman 8c Miller, 1986).
In the present research we build upon Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski's (1994) recent work on the
effects of counterfactual thinking. These authors showed that counterfactual thought can influence emo-
tional reactions to events in a way that goes beyond mere amplification. Specifically, they argued that "...
counterfactual thinking mediates affect, and ... that through its role in assessments ofcausation, coun[erfac-
tual Ihinking helps to shape the specifrc emotions an individual experiences in reaction to a situation" (p.
585, italics added). In their research Niedenthal er al. focused on the emotions guilt and shame, emotions
that have the same negative valence but different phenomenologies. They found that experiences of shame
were related to counterfactual thoughts in which aspects of the self were mutated, whereas experiences of
guilt were related to counterfactual thoughts in which aspects ofone's behavior were mutated. In the present
research we focus un two related emotions: regret and dLsappointment. These emotions share with guilt and
shame the characteristics that valence is negative, and that they are associated with mental undoing (Frijda,
Kuipers, 8r. Ter Schure, 1989; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, á van der Pligt, 1998). However, they also
differ from guilt and shame in important respects (cf. Landman, 1993; Zeelenberg, 1996). Experiences of
guilt and shame generally arise when some norm, moral or social, is violated. Regret and disappointment are
related to social or moral norms to a much lesser extent. These emotions are more utilitarian, that is, they
are more related to the hedonic value of decision outcomes or events. This presumably is why disappoint-
ment and (in particular) regret have attracted so much attention in research on individual decision-making
(see e.g., Beattie et al., 1994; Bell, 1982, 1985; Gull, 1991; Kelsey, á Schepanski, I991; Inman, Dyer, 8cRegrer unddisuppoimnrenr 3
Jia, 1997; Inman, á McAlister, 1994; Janis á Mann, 1977; Josephs, Larrick, Steele, á Nisbett, 1992; Lar-
rick, 8r. Boles, 1995; Loomes 8c Sugden, 1982, 1986, 1987; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, ~ Ritov, 1997; Richard,
van der Plig[, á de Vries, 1996; Ritov, 1996; Ritov, 8c Baron, 1995; Taylor, 1997; van Dijk, 8c van der
Pligt, 1997; Zeelenberg et al., I996; Zeelenberg, 8c Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, óc Manstead, nt
press). This decision research has shown that both regret and disappointment have clear behavioral conse-
quences. These consequences can arise from both the~anticipation of these emotions and from their experi-
ences. Although decision research (often implicitly) suggests tltat different sorts of counterfactual thinking
give rise to regret and disappointment, empirical studies that focus explicitly on the antecedents of regret
and disappointment are relatively sparse. Before addressing these proposed differences in the antecedents of
the experience ofregret and disappointment in more detail, we focus on the experience itself.
Are Regret and Disappointment Different Emotions?
Our key prediction is that the difference between regret and disappointment resides in the differential
counterfactual thought processes giving rise to the emotions. An important question is whether regret and
disappointment differ with respect to experiential content. In other words, are regret and disappointment
really two distinct emotions, each with its own characteristics, or are they essentially similar experiences
that go by different names? Emotion researchers argue that emotions can bc differentiated on the ha5Í5 of
the appraisals associated with the specific emotions (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, Antoniou, 8c 1ose,
1996), and on basis of their phenomenologies (Roseman, Wiest, á Swartz, 1994). We recently addressed
whether regret and disappointment could be differentiated on the basis of their appraisals and their phe-
nomenologies (see, van Dijk, van der Pligt, 8c Zeelenberg, 1998; Zeelenberg et a1., 1998).
Appraisal theorists state that each emotion can be related to specific patterns ofevaluations and inter-
pretations of events ("appraisals"). Some theorists argue for a strong causal relationship between appraisals
and emotions (e.g., Lazarus, 1991). Others argue that although appraisals do not always cause the emotions
or determine which specific emotion is experienced, they may characterize emotions (Parkinson, 1997). In
our appraisal study we focused on the appraisal pattern of six different negative emotions, but for the sake
of brevity we will only discuss the relations between regret and disappointment (see, van Dijk et al., 1998).
We asked participants to recall and describe a situation in which they felt either intense regret or intense
disappointment, and subsequently assessed their appraisals. Eight different appraisal dimensions were in-
cluded: unexpectedness, motivational state, situational state, probability, control potential, legitimacy,
problem source, and agency, the last of which was measured by three items (self-agency, other-person-
agency, and circumstances-agency). Roseman et aL (1996) found that these appraisal items differentiated
clearly between different emotions. Our study showed significant differences between regret and disap-
pointment on five appraisal dimensions, namely: unexpectedness, motivational state, control potential, le-
gitimacy, and agency (self-agency and circumstances-agency). Disappointment received higher ratings with
respect to unexpectedness, wanting something pleasurable, thinking that one was morally right, and causa-
tion by circumstances beyond anyone's control. Regret, on the other hand, received higher ratings with re-Regret und disuppaintment 4
spect to thinking that one could do something about the event, and self-causation.
In our study on the phenomenological experience of regret and disappointment we also asked partici-
pan[s to recall an instance of intense regret or disappoinhnent, and to indicate what they felt, [hought, fel[
like doing, did, and wanted during this experience (Leelenberg er al., 1998). We asked about these five dif-
ferent aspects of an emotional experience (i.e., feelings, thoughts, action tendencies, actions, and emotiva-
tions) because previous research had shown that discrete emotions can be differentiated on the basis ofthese
aspects (Roseman et al., 1994). There were several significant differences between regret and disappoint-
ment in each category. These differences were most pronounced for action tendencies (referring to what
participants felt like doing during the experience) and for emotivatíons (referring to specific emotional mo-
tives or goals that particípants had during the experience). More specifically, we found that the experience
of regret could be differentiated from that of disappoin[ment in that the former involves feeling more in-
tensely that one should have known better, thinking about what a mistake one has made, feeling a tendency
to kick oneselfand to correct one's mistake, wanting to undo the event and to get a second chance. We also
found that the experience of disappointment, more than that of regret, involves feeling powerless, feeling a
tendency to do nothing and to get away from the situation, actually turning away from the event, and want-
ing to do nothing-
Taken together, we found that regret and disappointment are associated with different appraisal pat-
terns and that tltey have different phenomenologies. Although we acknowledge that regret and disappoint-
ment have a much in common (both are related to risky decision making and uncertain outcomes, and origi-
nate in a comparison process in which the outcome obtained is compared to an outcome that might have
been), we interpret the t~ndings of these studies as indicating that regret and disappointment are different
emotions (see also, Frijda et al., 1989).
Regret and Disappointment Theory
Ideas about the role of regret and disappointment in decision-making were formalized by the econo-
mists Bell (1982, 1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1986, 1987). In their regret and disappointment
theories they explicitly state that decision-makers can experience emotions as a consequence of a decision.
Regret and disappointment theory also state that people anticipate these post-decisional emotions, and take
them into account when making decisions. The major difference in the antecedents of regret and disap-
pointmen[, according to these theories, is the source ojcomparrson from which the emotions arise. Although
regret and disappointment both stem from a comparison between "what is" and "what might have been,"
regret is assumed to originate from comparisons between the factual outcome and an outcome that might
have been had you chosen onother action; disappointment is assumed to originate from a comparison be-
tween the factual outcome and an outcome that might have been had unother state oJthe world occurred.
This difference can be illustrated by the choice depicted in Table l, where the outcome of the two actions (A
or B) depends on the occurrence of one of four possible states of the world. According to regret theory, a
decision-maker will feel regret after having chosen action A, and state of the world S2 occurs. Regret occursRegrer mrddlsuppuinrnten( 5
because the decision-maker knows that given this state of the world, action B would have resul[ed in a much
better outcome. According to disappointment theory, disappointment will be felt íf a decision-maker chose
action B, and state of the world S4 were to occur. The outcome obtained in this combination, á25, is worse
than the majority of outcomes which would have occurred in another state ofthe world. Note that although
one should experience disappointment when confronted with this outcome, one should not experience re-
gret, since the outcome of the rejected action was even worse.
Table l.
(Jutcomes ofActions A and Bfi~r Each Poss'ible .State oflhe World
States qrlhe World
S 1(25oro) S2 (25"ro) S3 (25"ro) S4 (25"ro)
Actions
A á 100 ~25 ~50 ~0
B SO SI00 a50 ~25
Note: 'fhis table depicts a choice between actions A and B, for which the outcomes depend on the
state ofthe world that occurs. Each state of the world has a probability of25"~.
Norm Theory, Regret and Disappointment
The ideas in regret and disappointment theory conceming the causes ofregret and disappointment are
easily combined with the counterfactual thinking approach derived from norm theory (Kahneman á Miller,
1986; see also Kahneman, 1992). Norm theory proposes that every outcome or event brings its own post-
computed norm, or frame ofreference, into being by the process of counterfactual thought. Evaluative reac-
tions to outcomes are based on a comparison between these outcomes and the post-computed norm. tn re-
gret and disappointment theory it is assumed that the decision-maker has prior knowledge of all possible
actions and the related outcomes for each state of the world. In other words, for each decision the decision-
maker knows the decision table depicted in Table l. The outcomes are then evaluated in relation to the other
possible outcomes. ln most real-life decisions, however, not all possible actions or states of the world are
known. In these cases, as norm theory suggests, decision-makers can imagine possible outcomes that would
have occurred, had things been different; that is, they can generate counterfactuals. Evaluative reactions to
the factual outcome can then be based on tlte comparison of this outcome to the post-computed counterfac-
tual alternatives.
Regret and disappointment theories suggest that two different sorts of counterfactuals produce regret
and disappointment. Recall that according to regret theory, regret is caused by comparing the outcomes of
different actions given a certain state of the world. The decision-maker controls which action is chosen.
Thus, undoing the outcome implies changing the decision-maker's choice. In counterfactual thinking terms,
this implies that one feels regret when one generates a counterfactual in which the outcome is undone by
changing something that was under one's personal control (e.g., one's reasoned actions or decisions).
Henceforth, we will refer to these counterfactuals as behavior-focused counterfactuals. According to disap-
pointment theory, disappointment is caused by comparing the outcomes of different states of the world
given a chosen option. Undoing the outcome implies changing the states of the world. This implies that oneRexrel unddi.cappotnrmenl 6
feels disappointment when one generates a counterfactual in which the outcome is undone by changing
something that was nor under one's control (e.g., another person's behavior or something in the situation).
Henceforth we will refer to these counterfactuals as situu[ionjocusedcounterjactuals.
In sum, we argue that the emotions regret and disappointment have different causes. Based on a
combination of regret theory and disappointment theory, on the one hand, and norm theory, on the other, we
propose that regret is the result of the generation of óehavior-focused counterfactuals, and that disappoint-
ment is the result of the generation of situation-focused counterfactuals. This reasoning is nicely illustrated
by the following citation in which the emotional reaction to an event depends heavily upon what is thought
to be mutable: "The child is disuppointed when the Tooth Fairy forgets his third lost tooth. The child's par-
ents rel;retthe lapse" (Landman, 1993, p. 47).
Study 1
In Study I we investigate counterfactual thinking about real-life events. Participants were asked to
recall and describe an event from their own lives in which they experienced either intense regret or intense
disappointment. Next they were asked to undo the event by generating four counterfactuals. These were then
coded as addressing things that were or were not under the participants' control. We expected that regret
participants would prednminantly mutate things that were under their control (e.g., [heir own behaviors),
whereas disappointment participants would predominantly mutate things that were not under [heir control
(e.g., aspects ofthe situation).
We also assessed ratings of emo[ions fel[ during the experience of the event. We asked for ratings of
regret, disappointment, and general affect. We expected that regret participants would report a high level of
regret, that disappointment participants would report a high level of disappointment, and that regret and dis-
appointment ratings wnuld be relatively unrelated to each other. We hoped that both groups of participants
would report the same level of general negative affect, so that possible differences between the two groups
would not be confounded with differences in overall negativity. Ratings of guilt and shame were also as-
sessed. Like regret and disappointment,these emotions are related to counterfactualthinking (Niedenthal et
ul., 1994). Inclusion of these variables enabled us to examine the relationships among these four negative
emotíons. We expect these two emotions to be more closely related to regret than to disappointment, be-
cause regret, guilt and shame all share a sense ofresponsibility for the negative outcome or event.
The last set of variables included in this study related to internal and external attribution. Niedenthal
et aL (1994) argued that the shaping ofemotions through counterfactual thinking might occur through the
role played by counterfactuals in assessments of causation. However, in their study attributions were not
assessed. Research by Wells and Gavanski (1989) shows that people use counterfactual thinking in assess-
ing the causal role ofevents (see also Lipe, 1991). In their first experiment, Wells and Gavanski asked par-
ticipants to read a vignette in which a woman dies from an allergic reaction to a dish ordered by her boss.
Tlie boss was described as having considered the ordered dish and an alternative dish. When the alternative
dish did nur contain the allergic ingredient, the boss' role in the woman's tragic death was judged as moreRegre! unddisuppuinlmenl 7
causalthan when the other dish also contained the allergic ingredient. It appears that people attribute out-
comes to those factors that are imagined to covary with those outcomes. Thus counterfactual thoughts about
how an outcome was achieved can influence the attributions that people make. This, in turn, could inFluence
the affective reaction to the outcome (cf. Weiner, 1982, 1986).
In short, we suggest thatthe effects of behavior-focused counterfactuals on regret is more strongly
mediated by internal attributions, and that the effects ófsituation-focused counterfactuals on disappointment
is more strongly mediated by external attributions (cf. Zeelenberg, van Dijk, á Manstead, 1998).
Method
Design und Participants. The study had a 2-group between-subjects design (Regret vs. Disappoint-
ment). Students at the University of Amsterdam (N-130) participated in this experiment, which was part of
a larger experimental session. There were 65 participants per condition. They were paid 10 Dutch Guilders
(approximately á6.50 at the time of[he study) for their participation.
Prncedure and MaJerial. Booklets containing the questionnaires were randomly distributed among
the participants. The experiment lasted about 15 minutes. Depending upon the condition they were in, par-
ticipants were asked to describe an occasion in which they felt either intense regret or intense disappoint-
ment. Next, on the subsequeul page, mutations were measured hy asking the paRicipants to complete four
"If only...." stems. The instruction read (translated from the original Dutch): "The event you described
could, of course, have had a better ending. What could have been different about yourself, your behavior, or
the situation so that the event would have had a better ending?"
Then participants rated the amount of regret, disappointment, guilt and shame they felt during the
event. These were measured on 10-point scales with endpoints labeled none ( I) and very much (10). We as-
sessed general affect by asking how the event made them feel in general. This was measured on an 1 1-point
scale, with endpoints labeled very good (-5) and very bud (5). Attributions were also assessed. Participants
were asked "How responsible do you find yourself for the event?", to be answered on a 10-point scale with
endpoints labeled not responsible (1) and very responsib(e (10). They were also asked "To what extent did
you cause the event?" and "To what extent did extemal factors cause the event?" These questions were to be
answered on 10-point scales with endpoints labeled a very sma!! extent ( I) and a very qrea[extent (10).
Half the participants completed the procedure in the order described above, while the other half was
asked first for [he ratings, and then for mutations. Since there were no order effects, data from the two
groups were analyzed together.
Resulrs
Mutarions. The main hypothesis was that participants in the regret condition would prefer to mutate
things that were under their own control, and thus generate behavior-focused counterfactuals, whereas par-
ticipants in the disappointment condition would prefer to mutate things that were not under their control,
and thus generate situation-focused counterfactuals. In order to test this prediction two independent judges,
blínd to the experimental conditions, coded the `If only' completions as addressing behavior, or the self, orRegrer unddisuppainonenr 8
aspects of the situation (cE Niedenthal et al., 1994). For example, completions in which acts or non-acts of
the participant were mutated (e.g., those that took the form of "If only I had invited more people, my party
would have been successful") were coded as addressing behavior. Completions focusing on chronic aspects
of the participant's character , or who or what slhe is, were coded as mutations of the self (e.g., "If only I
was more persistent, he would have wanted to go out with me"). Finally, the completions relating to external
forces were coded as addressing situational aspects (e.g., "If only the exam would have been easier, I would
have passed"). The interrater agreement for these judgments was 86"~0; disagreements were resolved by dis-
cussion. The data set contained a total of 486 mutations (not all participants completed all four 'If only'
stems). Only 11 out of the 486 (2.40~0) were uncodable. All analyses were done using the remaining 475
mutations. Table 2 shows the results for both the first mutations generated and for the total number of mu-
tations generated. Separate analyses were carried out on the first mutatíons generated because these pre-
sumably reflect the most accessible beliefs about altematives to reality (cf. Niedenthal et al., 1994). It can
be seen that, for both the first and the total number of mutations, behavior was mutated most often in the
regret condition, and situation was mutated most often in the disappointment condition.
Table 2.
First(Within Parentheses) and Total oJA-lutations by C'afegory, fnr the Regret and Disappointment
Conditions (Study I)
Mutations
Behavior Self Situation Mutation Index
condition:
Regret 132 (44) 34 (8) 76 (13) -.l 13 (-.354)
Disappointment 91 (26) 44 (10) 98 (29) .246 (.200)
Nore. The mutation index is a mean score ofthe mutations generated, in which the mutations ofbehavior were
coded as -I, and the mutations ofselfand situation as t 1. This mutation index could range from - I, ifonly be-
haviors were mutated, to tI, if only aspects of the situation or the selfwere mutated. The mutation index based
on only [he first mutation is shown within parentheses.
For purposes of statistical analyses we coded the mutations of behavior as -l, and mutations of situa-
tional aspects and mutations of the self as l. We decíded to combine the mutations of situational and self
because both mutations focus on things that are not under the control of the decision-maker (cf. Markman 8c
Weary, 1997). In contrast, mutations of behavior focus on actions ofthe decision-maker that were under his
or her control. These uncontrollable and controllable aspects can be seen respectively as related to the deci-
sion-maker's actions and to the possible states ofthe world depicted in Table l.l A Chi-square test for 2x2
tables with first mutations as dependent variables shows that participants in the Regret condition tended to
mutate the controllable aspects (i.e., behavior) more often, and that that participants in the Disappointment
condition tended to mutate the uncontrollable aspects (i.e., situation and self) more often; X2 (1) - 9.95, p ~
I Altematively, one might argue[hat mutations ofselfshould be coded as 0 because they (all in between mutations of behavior and
mutations o(situation (mutations of the selfcould be regarded as the mutation ofthings [hatare not really uncontrollable, but neither
uncontrollable). We reran all analyses with this altemative coding, and fuund that the results were unaffuted by it.R,;~rrr~rnJJrr,y,trrrrnnn.~rn `1
01. Ne~t. the data for all mutations ssere anahzed. This svas dune by computing a mean mutation index
(both nn~utiun indirrs are depicted in Table 2), in which the all mutations were summed and divided b~ the
total number of mutations. This analcsis ~ ielded the samc restdt. t( I?R) - 3.;7, p~.001.
Rutbr,~s. Table 3 depic[s the mean respunscs on thc emotion and attributiun rating scalcs. Regret was
the duminant emotion in the regret cundition: 1b'ithin this cundition ratings of rcgret were signitir.tnth
higher than ratin,s of all other emotions, all n(G-l) ~''.6?, ps ~.Oi, In the Disappoinnnent condition, ra[ings
of disappointment svere sígniticantl~ higher than ratings ofall other emotions, all ts(G4) ~ I I ~JO, ps ~ .001.
Table 3.
,tilenns.J'or láe Depenclenl Varinbles in Ilre Regrc~t nnd Disappninlnu~nl ('ondilinns (Sluelv !)
('undition
Regret Disappointment F(1,128) p~
Emorinns
Regret 8.3? 4.65 76.51 .001
Disappointment 6.49 9.02 64.35 .001
Guilt 7.48 4.03 5452 001
Shame 6.66 4.43 I8.15 .001
General Aflective Reaction 3.28 3.26 0.01 ns.
Atlribtdions
Responsibility 7.85 ~.IS 35.60 .001
Internal Attribution 7.75 4.92 39.93 .001
External Attribution ~.29 Z28 19.68 001
,Vote. En[ries for regret, disappointmen[. ~uilt and shame are mean answers on 10-point scales with endpoints la-
beled nune ( I) and very. mach (10). Entries for General At7ec[ive Reaction are mean answers on a I I-point scale,
with endpoints labeled vervgood (-5) and verr bad (5). Entries for attributions are mean answers [o "How re-
sponsible do you find yourself for the event?", measured on a 10-point scale with endpoints labeled nnt respon-
sible ( I) and very responsible (10), and mean answers "To what extent did you cause the event?" and "To what
extent did external fac[ors cause the event?" measured on a 10-point scale with endpoints a very sma(I exrent ( I)
and a very greal extent ( I0).
Moreover, a MANOVA with condition (Regret vs. Disappointment) as the independent variable and
the emotion and attribution scales as dependent variables revealed a significant multivariate difference be-
tween the two conditions, F(8,121) - 21.97, p ~.001. Univariate tests showed that a significant difference
existed for 7 ofthe 8 ratings (see Table 3). All differences were in the predicted direction.
Participants in the Regret condition reported more regret than did those in the Disappointment condi-
tion, and participants in the Disappointment condition reported more disappointment than did those in the
Regret condition. The high levels of regret and disappointment reported in the corresponding conditions
sliow that participants did indeed recall events in which they experienced intense regret or disappointment.
It is important to note that in both conditions the recalled events were associated with the same level of gen-
eral negative affect.
As anticipated, participants who recalled an experience of intense regret reported having experienced
more guilt and shame than did participants who recalled an experience of intense disappointment. This sug-
gested that guilt and shame are more closely related to regret than to disappointment. Support for this was
also found in the corcelations between the different emotions (see Table 4 for correlations among the de-ReKrc~t andd(sappuinfinent 10
pendent variables). Regret, guilt and shame were all positively correlated, whereas the correlations between
these emotions and disappointment were all negative. Moreover, the absolute magnitude of the correlations
ofregret with guilt and shame are greater than those for disappointment with guilt and shame.
Table 4.
Correlations Between the Dependent Variables (Study 1)
General Internal External Mutation
Regret Disapp. Guilt Shame Affect Resp. Attr. Attr. Index
Regret --
Disapp. -.29" --
Guill 60'" -.32"' --
Sliame 42" -.22' S2" --
Gen. Affect . 19' .08 .18' .23" --
Rcsp. 55" -.19` .56" 44" .07 --
Internal 51 "' -.22" 55" .42" .08 78" --
External -.43"' .15' -.46" -.38" -.07 -.61" -.76" --
M.Index -.29" .20' -.33" -.10 -.07 -.35" -.37"' .33ra
Nnle. "- p ~.0~. '"- p ~ .01
Attribution ratings were also in accordance with our predictions. Regret participants judged them-
selves as more rospuusiblo for the event than did Disappnintment pSrticipants. Regret participants also
judged the extent to which they caused the event to be greater than did Disappointment participants. Disap-
pointment participants judged the extent to which external factors caused the event to be greater than did
Regret participants.
Relations between mutation.s, attributions, and emotions. The central argument in this paper is that
regret and disappointment are related to different types of counterfactual thinking. We argue that regret is
related to behavioral-focused counterfactual thinking, and that disappointment is related to situation-focused
counterfactual thinking. As can be seen in Table 4, the significant correlations between the mutation index
and the reported regret and disappointment support this reasoning. The negative correlation between the
mutation index and regret indicates that as the mutations become more behavior-focused, regret becomes
more intense. The positive correlation between the mutation index and disappointment indicates that as the
mutations become more situation-focused, disappointment becomes more intense.
Niedenthal et aL (1994) argued that the effects of counterfactual thinking are mediated by attribu-
tional processes. However, they did not assess attributions, and were therefore unable to test this argument.
Attributions were measured in the present study. As shown in Table 4, the correlations between regret and
the different attribution measures were significant and in the predicted direction (positive correlations with
internal attribution and responsibility, and a negative correlation with external attribution), indicating that
more internal attributions were associated with more intense regret. For disappointment these correlations
showed the reverse pattern, indicating that more extemal attributions were associated with more intense dis-
appointment. For further analyses we combined the three attribution ratings, after reverse scoring the meas-
ure of extemal factors, into one measure (Cronbach's alpha - 0.88). This new attribution measure couldRegre[ und disuppoinlnirnl I I
range from I to 10, with higher scores implying more internal attributions.
A series of regression equations were calculated to test for media[ion (cf. Baron á Kemiy, 1986).
These tests were done separately for regret and disappointment. The predictor variable in these equations
was the mutation index, the mediator was the attribution score, and either regret or disappoinhnent served as
the outcome variable. To test for mediation we first regressed the mediator on the predictor variable, then
regressed the outcome variable on the predictor variable, and finally regressed the outcome variable on both
the predictor variable and the mediator. Perfect mediation holds when:(a)the predictor affects the mediator
in the tirst equation; (b) the predictor affects the outcome in the second equation; (c) the mediator affects the
outcome in the third equation; and (d) when the predictor has no effect when controlling for the mediator in
the third equation.
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Figure l. Models testing for the mediating role of attributions (` - p ~.OS).
The results of these regression equations are depicted in Figure l. The values in this figure are stan-
dardized regression weights. The upper halfof this figure shows results for regret. These show that: (a) mu-
tations predict attributions; (b) mutations predict regret (upper left-hand corner beta weight); (c) attributions
predict regret; and (d) mutations have no predictive power when controlling for attributions (upper right-
hand corner beta weight). Attributions can therefore be said to mediate the influence of mutations on regret.
Similar results were found for disappointment (see lower halfof Figure 1).
Drscussion
"fhe results of this study confirm the hypothesis concerning the role of counterfactual thinking in re-
gret and disappointment. Regret experiences were more associated with counterfactuals addressing behav-
ioral actions, whereas disappointment experiences were more associated with counterfactuals addressing
situational factors. It should be noted, however, that in spite ofthe significant differences in mutation focus,
participants in the regret condition also mutated a considerable number of uncontrollable aspects of the
situation, and that participants in the disappointment condition also mutated their own behaviors. This mightRc~rei unddisappoinrmen~ I 2
be regarded as detrimental to our hypotheses. However, it should be remembered that participants were
explicitly asked to mutate things about themselves, their behavior, or the situation that would have pre-
vented the regretted event. A more formal analysis of regret-eliciting situations shows that regret can be un-
done by mutating one's choice or the state ofthe world that occurred. For example, the most regretful situa-
tion in Table I would be choosing action B after which state of the world S1 occurs. After this happens the
decision-maker can mutate the choice ofaction B, but also the occurrence of Sl, since both would have pre-
vented this situation from happening, and both are thus equally valid answers to the question asked.
Moreover, outcomes of real-life decisions are almost always multiply determined. A feature of a
cause is that had it been different, the event would not have occurred. Hence, in real life one can mutate a
large number of things, of which one's own behavior is a small, but of course salient, subset. Finally, there
are also several other factors that influence what gets muta[ed. For exantple, people are more likely to mu-
ta[e causes that are proximal in time to the focal event than causes that are more distal in time (e.g., Miller
8r Gunasegaram, 1990), and they are more likely to mutate things that are under their own control (e.g.,
their behaviors) than things that are not under their own control (Girotto, Legrenzi, á Rizzo, 1991; Mark-
man, Gavanski, Sherman, á McMullen, 1995; Rcese, 8c Olson, 1995). We regard it as telling that we found
tiiLnificant differences in mutation focus for regret and disappointment, despite the fact that what gets mu-
tated is known to be influenced by all these other factors.
Additional findings were that experienced regret was primarily related to intemal attributions and
mutations of behavior, whereas experienced disappointment was primarily related to extemal attributions
and mutations of the situation. Mediational analyses revealed that attributions mediated the effects of coun-
terfactual thinking on the experience of regret and disappointment.
Summarizing, the findings support the idea that regret and disappointment are associated with differ-
ent types of counterfactual thought. These findings suggest that counterfactual thinking not only amplifies
affect, but also shapes ic According to our reasoning, regret is shaped by the generation ofbehavior-focused
counterfactuals, whereas disappointment is shaped by the generation of situation-focused counterfactuals.
Study 2
In Study 1 we showed that the experience of regret and disappointment is related to two different
types of counterfactuals. Although we argue that these qualitatively different counterfactuals shape the ex-
perience ofregret and disappointment, and the results of inediational analyses were consistent with this rea-
soning, Study I did not provide a direct test of this causal relationship. The present study was developed to
provide such a test. Participants in this study had to imagine themselves in a situation that could elicit either
regret or disappointment (or a combination of the two). Half the participants were instructed to undo the
event by mutating aspects oftheir behavior, while ihe other halfwere instructed to undo the event by mutat-
ing aspects of the situation. Next, all participants were asked to indicate the level of regret and disappoint-
ment they would feel in such a situation. We predicted that after mutating behavior participants would feel
more regret than disappointment, but that they would feel more disappointment than regret after mutatingRegret und disuppoinrment I3
situational aspects.
Methnd
Desii;n uncl Pur[icipun[s. The experiment had a 2-group between-subjects design (Mutate: Behavior
vs. Situation). Dependent variables were ratings of disappointment and regret. Students at the University of
Amsterdam (N-50) participa[ed in this experiment, which was part of a larger experimental session for
which they received 10 Guilders (approximately ~6.50). There were 25 participants per condition.
Procedureund Muleriul. All participants were presented with the same scenario. They were asked to
vividly imagine the events in the scenario as happening to them, and to read the scenario twice. The scenario
read as follows (translated from the original Dutch):
Some time ago you signed up for a day [rip. The trip included a visit to several buildings that are normally not
open to the public, but which were opened especially for this occasion. You found this very attractive. You paid
a non-refundable deposit of25 Dutch Guilders.z At 9.30 a.m. you had to be at Amsterdam Central Station where
a special bus would leave.
The evening before the trip you met a friend in a bar. At first, you did not intend to make i[ very late.
As soon as the two of you were in the bar you started having a great time, and quite a few drinks. It was getting
late and although you realized this you decided to stay a little longer.
Things do not go smoothly the next momíng. You intended to set the alarm clock yesterday, but forgot
to do so. You have to hurry. You quickly eat something and jump on your bicycle. Since you spent too much
money yesterday you have [o get some cash. You have some money left, but you want to be sure that it is
enoueh fnr the Whole day. The first cash dispenser on your route happens to be out oforder. You decide to go to
another one, although it is not on your route to the station. You withdraw your money and continue your jour-
ney. There are road works on the way to the station. You decide to ignore these. This is not good for your tires,
and you get a puncture. You abandon your bicycle and walk to a tram stop. The tram hasjust departed. You take
[he next one and finally you're on your way. Just before you reach the station the [ram is stopped by a group of
protesters. All passengers have to get out. You think of running to the s[ation, but calculate that it should be
possible to continue walking at a normal pace. You decide to walk because you don't want to feel sweaty while
sitting in the bus. When you arrive at the station you see that your calculation was wrong. You are too late. The
bus is just tuming the comer and disappearing from view.
After reading the scenario, participants in the Mutate Behavior condition were stimulated to generate
behavior-focused counterfactuals. This was done by asking them to complete two sentence stems, starting
with: IJnnly l.... The explicit instruction read: "Complete the following two sentences by indicating how
aspects of your own choices, decisions, or behavior could have been different so that the event would have
had a better ending." Participants in the Mutate Situation condition were stimulated to engage in situation-
focused counterfactual thinking. This was done by asking them to complete two sentence stems, starting
with: If only .... The explicit instruction read: "Complete the following Iwo sentences by indicating how as-
pects of the situation, thus things that you could not influence yourself, could have been different so that the
event would have had a better ending." Then participants rated the amount of disappointment and regret
they would feel after experiencing the event. These were measured on 10-point scales with endpoints la-
beled none (1) and very much (IO).
~ iwenty-tivc Dutch Guilders eyualled approximately S16 at the time the study was ran.Regrer und disuppoinrment 14
Re.rults und Discu.~sion
The mean ratings are depicted in Table 5. Participants' answers were submitted to a 2 (Mutate: Be-
havior vs. Situation) x 2(Emotion: Regret vs. Disappointment) ANOVA, with Emotion as a within-subjects
factor. This analysis yielded a main effect for Mutate, F(1,48) - 6.42, p ~.005. More interestingly, the
analysis also yielded the predicted Mutate x Emotion interaction, F(1,48) - 9.89, p ~ .005. As expected,
participants in the Mutate Behavior condition reported more regret than disappointment, F( 1,48) - 5.85, p ~
.05, while participants in the Mutate Situation condition reported more disappointment than regret, F(1,48)
-4.II,p~.05.
Table 5.




Mutate Behavior 8.04a 7.006
Mutate Situation 5.80b 7.04a
Nwe. Entries are mean responses to the questions: "How much regret [disappoint-
ment~ would you feel when experiencing the event?" Particípan[s could answer
both questíons on 10-point scales, with endpoints labeled none (I) and very much
(10). Means within rows not shazing a common subscript differat p ~.05.
These findings are therefore supportive of the conclusion drawn from Study 1 that regret is the domi-
nant experience when counterfactual thoughts undo the outcome of an event by changing aspects that are
under personal control, such as one's own choices, decisions or behavior. Disappointment, on the other
hand, is the dominant experience when counterfactual thoughts undo [he outcome of an event by changing
things that are beyond one's control, that is, aspects ofthe situation.
It needs to be noted that tlte level ofdisappointment was similar in both mutation conditions, suggest-
ing that only regret is differentially influenced by the two sorts of counterfactual thoughts. However, we
should take note of the fact that participants in Study 2 had to indicate both the level of regret and the level
of disappointment they would feel. It may have been the case that these ratings influenced each other (cf.
Niedenthal et al., 1994), and that this reactivity helped to produce the obtained results. In order rule out this
possibility, and to replicate the results of Study 2 using a different scenario, we conducted a third study.
Study 3
In Study 3 participants again read a scenario that could have elicited both regret and disappointment.
Half the participants were instructed to undo [he event by mutating aspects oftheir behavior, while the other
halfwere instructed to undo the event by mutating aspects of the situation. Next, participants reported erther
the level of regret or the level disappointment they would feel in such a situation. By making the measure-
ment of these emotions a between-subjects factor, we avoided possible problems of reactivity in their as-
sessment. We predicted that after mutating behavior participants would feel more regret than disappoint-
ment, and that after mutating situational aspects participants would feel more disappointment than regret.ReKrer und disuppuintmen! I 5
Merhud
DesiRn und Purticipunts. The experiment had a 2(Mutate: Behavior vs. Situation) x 2(Emotion
rated: Regret vs. Disappointment) between-subject factorial design. Students at the University of Amster-
dam (N - 140) participated in order to gain course credit. There were 35 participants per condition.
Procedure unc! Muteriul. Participants were again asked to read a scenario in which a person experi-
ences a negative event, and were instructed to vividly imagine the situation happening to them. The scenario
read as follows (translated from the original Dutch):
A few months ago you went into town one morning to buy a VCR. VCRs are generally quite expensive, and be-
cause you do no[ have too much money, you have given careful [hought to this purchase. You consulted some
friends, visited a few shops, and eventually you decided to buy a Sony. Although it is qui[e expensive, it came
out as one ofthe best in tests. Moreover, one of your friends has the same model and is very happy with it. You
arrive at [he shop and see tha[ [hey are holding an autumn sale. They have some models at reduced prices, but
sadly enough not [he one you had chosen to buy. You decide to check which models are on sale now. The sales-
person tells you that the Ariston is a very good purchase. It is a very beautiful model, and now especially good
value. Although you had originally resolved to buy the Sony, now you have some doubts. You would save a lot
of money if you bought the Aríston, and the quality ofthe [wo probably does not differ that much. You are un-
sure about which one to buy and you discuss this with the salesperson. The salesperson advises you to buy the
Ariston. This is what you eventually do. You do partly for the reasons given by the salesperson, but also because
you can take the Ariston home immedia[ely, whereas the only Sony left is the display model. If you were to buy
the Sony you would have had to wait until the weekend, when a new shipment is due to arrive.
You go home excited, and install your VCR right away. Soon you discover that the sound quality is not
to your liking, but you know lhat Lccause it was an item on sale you eannot get your money back. This is not [he
only drawback: After four months the VCR breaks down. You return to the shop and the salesperson tells you
that the warranty on sales items only lasts three months. You can have your VCR repaired, but it will cost you at
leas[ two hundred Dutch Guilders.3
After reading the scenario, participants were asked to generate behavioral or situational counterfactu-
als. The mutation insiructions were identical to those used in Study 2. Then participants rated either the
amount of regret or the amount of disappointment they would feel after experiencing the event. These were
measured on I 0-point scales with endpoints Iabeled none (I) and very much (10).
Table 6.




Mutate Behavior 8.17a 7.376
Mutate Situation 7.676 8.49a
Nore Entries are answers [o the questions: "How much regret [disappointment]
would you feel when experiencing the event?" Participants answered the regret
or the disappointment question. Participants could answer on a 10-point scale,
with endpoints labeled none ( I) and very much (10). Means within rows no[
sharing a common subscrip[ differ at p ~.05.
Results und Discussion
Mean regret and disappointment ratings are depicted in Table 6. These were submitted to a 2(Mutate:
3 Two hundred Dutch Guilders equalled approximately 5130 at [he timethe data were collected.ReXrer anddisappointment I 6
Behavior vs. Situation) x 2(Emotion rated: Regret vs. Disappointment) ANOVA. This analysis yielded only
a significant interaction effect, F(1,136) - 8.31,p ~ .005. Simple main effects analyses revealed that partici-
pants who were instructed to mutate theír behavior reported more regret than disappointment, F(1,136) -
4.01, p ~.05, and that participants who were instructed to mutate situational aspects reported more disap-
pointmènt than regre[, F(1,136) - 4.30, p ~.05. The findings of Study 2 were therefore replicated.
General Discussion
The present research shows that experiences of regret and disappointment are caused by counterfac-
tuals that vary in focus. Counterfactual thoughts in which decisions, choices, or reasoned actions are mu-
tated, which we called behavior focused counterjactuals, result in the experience of ret;ret. Counterfactual
thoughts in which aspects of the situation, or things that are beyond the actor's control are mutated, which
we called situation-jocused counterfactuals, result in the experience of disappointment. This finding cor-
roborates the assumptions of regret and disappointment theory concerning the causes of these emotions.
Moreover, it extends these theories to situations in which the decision-maker does not know all possible op-
tions or states of the world. Our research shows that in these situations people are able to imagine other
possible outcomes (cf Sugden, 1985), and that these imagined outcomes influence their emotional reaction
to the real outcome.
In Study I we focused on real-life regret and disappointment. We asked participants to recall an event
from their own life in which they experienced intense regret or disappointment. When asked to undo this
event by changing any aspect they wanted, participants who had reported a regret event mainly mutated
their own actions. However, participants who had reported a disappointment event mainly mutated aspects
in the situation. In addition we found that the effects of these mutations on regret and disappointment were
mediated by attributional processes.
In Study 2 we focused on emotional reactions to hypothetical events. Participants read a scenario in
which a person experiences a negative outcome. The cause ofthis outcome could in principle be construed
as residing in the person's own actions, and~or in aspects ofthe situation. In accordance with our hypothesis
and consistent with Study I, participants instructed to generate behavior-focused counterfactuals reported
more regretthan disappointment. Likewise, participants instructed to generate situation-focused counterfac-
tuals reported more disappointment than regret.
In Study 3 we replicated the findings from Study 2 using a different scenario and a design in which
the measurement of regret and disappointment was a between-subjects factor. We again found that partici-
pants instructed to generate behavior-focused counterfactuals reported more intense regret than disappoint-
ment, and that participants instructed to generate situation-focused counterfactuals reported more intense
disappointment than regret.
Implications, jor Norm Theory
The present research extends the ideas about emotiona! amplifrcation proposed in norm theory
(Kahneman 8~ Miller, 1986). Most previous research on the influence ofcounterfactual thinking on emotionRexrer anddisappoinrmenr U
has shown that counterfactual thoughts affect the inrensity of affective reactions to outcomes. The easier it is
to generate a counterfactual outcome, the stronger is the affective reaction to the factual outcome. The pres-
ent research, together with that of Niedenthal et al. (1994), shows that counterfactual thinking influences
affective reaction not only in this quantimrive way, but also in a qualitarive way. The type ofcounterfactual
thoughts, i.e., their conlera andfncus, determines which specific emotion is felt.
We are only beginning to understand the role of counterfactualthought in the causation of emotion,
and there are still many unresolved questions. For example, a comparison of the present findings with those
ofNiedenthal er al. (1994) reveals that regret and guilt both result from the generation of behavior-focused
counterfactuals, thereby suggesting some fundamental similarities between these emotions. However, other
researchers, working within an appraisal theory tradition, have shown that guilt and regret are different
emotions (see, e.g., Frijda e( a1. 1989; Roseman et ol., 1994). The difference between regret and guilt
probably lies in the fact that guilt (in contrast with regret) is more related to the violation ofsocial or moral
norms, or that guilt is more associated with the perception of harming another person (or, conceivably, a
Iiving being). It might therefore be useful to look not only at what gets mutated (behavior, selfor situation),
but also at what gets undone by this mutation (e.g., does a normal behavior get undone, or does a violation
nf a social nr mnral norm or the harming ofanother person get undone?).
Another way in which the present findings contribute to our understanding of the role played by
counterfactual thinking in the generation of emotions concerns disappointment. Disappointment was found
to be associated with the generation of situation-focused counterfactuals. Levine (1996) has recently sug-
gested that disappointing events can result in sadness or anger, depending on how the event is appraised. In
keeping with this we argue that disappointment is likely to be associated with feelings of sadness when the
situation-focused counterfactuals concern things that were under no-one's control (e.g., the weather), and
with feelings ofanger when the situation-focused counterfactuals concern other persons' behaviors.
Implicatinnsfnr Decision Research
Our findings concerning the role of counterfactual thinking are relevant for decision research. AI-
though research on counterfactual thinking initially focused on post-decisional reactions to outcomes or
events, some researchers have suggested that counterfactual thinking also influences future decision-making
(Boninger, Gleicher, 8c Strathman, 1994; Gleicher et al., 1995; Miller, 1991; Taylor á Pham, 1996). When
making decisions people sometimes run a sort of inental simulation of what might happen before they ac-
tually make the decision. In this way decision-makers `pre-compute the post-computed thoughts' (ef. Miller,
1991). These types of thoughts can be described as prejactuals (cf Gleicher et al., 1995). As a result of
these thoughts people may anticipate the regret and disappointment they would feel as a consequence of
their decision. This is exactly what is assumed in regret and disappointment theory (Bell, 1982, 1985;
Loomes 8c Sugden, 1982, 1986, 198~). Following the line of reasoning developed in the present paper, we
suggest that the generation of behaviorjocusedprefactuals will make future regret salient and promote re-
gret aversion. Likewise, the generation of situutionfocused prejactuals will make future disappointmentReKret and disappointmenl I 8
salient and promote disappointment aversion. How might decision-making processes be influenced the gen-
eration of these different types of prefactualthought? In our view behavior-focused and situation-focused
prefactuals would have different effects on preference and choice.
There is considerable evidence concerning the role of anticipated regret in decision-making. For ex-
ample, Simonson (1992) asked consumers to imagine the regret they would feel after deciding between two
options and then finding out that the other choice would have been a better one. Asking consumers to gen-
erate these behavioral-prefactuals made them more likely to purchase an item that would shield them from
this possible regret (i.e., a higher-priced, well-known brand), over a potentially better item (a less expensive,
but lesser-known brand; see also Richard et a!. [ 1996] for similar findings concerning decisions to engage in
safe sex). More recently Zeelenberg et al. (1996; Zeelenberg 8c Beattie, 1997) showed that decision-makers
who anticipate post-decisional counterfactual feedback choose to minimize the possible regret that could
stem from comparing what is with what might have been. By doing so they made risk-seeking as well as
risk-avoiding choices, depending on which choice minimized the possible regret. We therefore predictthat
people who generate behavior-focused prefactuals will anticipate future regret, and will consequently
choose the regret minimizing-option.
Research on ánticipated disappointment ís sparse. We predict, however, a relationship between the
anticipation of this emotion and risk aversion. If one agrees with Bell's definition of disappointment as a
"psychological reaction to an outcome that does not match up to expectations" (Bell, 1985, p. I), it is clear
that risky options have a large potential to create disappointment (van Dijk á van der Pligt, 1997). Safe op-
tions are ones that lead to a certain outcome that is known in advance carry no risk ofdisappointment. One
already knows the outcome, and therefore the outcome is the expectation (cf Zeelenberg e~ al., 1998). In
risky options, by contrast, the outcome can exceed or fall short of the expectation level, and disappointment
is therefore possible. We would thus predict that people who generate situation-focused prefactuals will an-
ticipate this disappointment, and will consequently reduce the amount of risk they are willing to take.
Conclusions
The present research focused on emotional reactions to decision outcomes. The results show that dif-
ferent types of counterfactual thought about how these decision outcomes came about give rise to qualita-
tively different emotions. Behavior-focused counterfactuals, in which the decision-maker's behavior is mu-
tated, result in feelings of regret, whereas situation-focused counterfactuals, in which things that were not
under the decision-maker's control are mutated, result in feelings ofdisappointment. This extends previous
thinking about the role of counterfactual thinking in emotional experiences, where the focus was on emo-
tíonal amplification. Extending the findings from the present research on counterfactual thinking to that of
prefactualthinking resulted in testable hypotheses about the effects of prefactual thinking, via the anticipa-
tion of regret and disappointment, on decision-making. The generation of behavior-focused prefactuals is
hypothesized to result in regret-minimizing choices, while the generation of situation-focused prefactuals is
hypothesized to result in disappointment-minimizing choices.Re,qret and disappointment 19
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